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Over the last three and a half decades, the highly remarkable economic 
performance of the once low-income and inward-looking state of China 
has attracted increasing interest from academics and policymakers. 
According to ofﬁcial data, China superseded Germany to become the 
world's third largest economy in early 2008, ranked only after the United 
States and Japan. Based on a report published on China's National 
Bureau of Statistics website on 14 January 2009, the conﬁrmed 2007 
gross domestic product (GDP) of China at current prices amounted to 
25.7 trillion yuan.1 While still short of a third of the USA's GDP, ana-
lysts then predicted China's GDP would overtake Japan's in three to 
four years, just as it overtook the United Kingdom and France in 2005 
and Germany in 2008. Three years later, Yi Gang, the director of the 
State Administration of Foreign Exchange and the deputy governor of 
China's central bank, the People's Bank of China, announced on 30 July 
2010 that China had already superseded Japan to become the world's 
second largest economy.2 Impressive as it is, beyond the stated inten-
tion of fostering modernization and marketization, China's reform and 
transformation have not been achieved in accord with an agreed and 
clearly established blueprint. Rather, it has been a result of policies and 
ideas formulated and tested as market-based reforms proceeded much 
in accordance with Deng Xiaoping's well-known gradualist dictum: 
'crossing the river by groping the stones'.3 At the same time, as domestic 
economic reform and attendant social transformation were progressing 
at impressive speed, China has emerged as a regional and global power. 
China's transformed international proﬁle has been one of the most piv-
otal changes underway in the contemporary world. It is a change that 
has also given rise to much debate over the weight to be given to do-
mestic and external forces in explaining China's current world position.
 One aspect of China's astounding economic development is the 
construction of a modern infrastructure and transportation system. In 
his article, 'China's Eagerness to Export its High-speed Rail Expertise 
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to ASEAN Members', Yu Hong addresses this issue, focusing on the 
promotion of China's high-speed rail technology in foreign markets 
under its 'going-out' strategy. 
On the political front, with the 18th National Congress of the Com-
munist Party of China concluded on 15 November 2012 and the birth 
of a new Politburo Standing Committee, the Party thus completed its 
second orderly handover of power in more than six decades of its rule 
over this most populous country in the world, and today, the world's 
second largest economic entity. Nevertheless, also marking that year are 
various other poignant events that continue today that reﬂect strained 
State–civil society relations in this vast country. Among these, undoubt-
edly epitomizing the contemporary socio-political dilemmas of the 
People's Republic of China (PRC), is the proliferation of public protests 
mainly related to forced demolition and relocation, industrial pollution 
and ofﬁcial corruption, and related to this, the State response to civil 
rights-defending (weiquan) activism and its treatment of such activists as 
part of the wider dissident community. The continued unfolding of this 
systemic issue, indeed, has to be properly placed in the overall context 
of the problem of increasingly acute socio-economic inequality, includ-
ing its ethno-regional dimension, which in many ways constitutes the 
epitome as well as the root of China's social ills resulting from its recent 
decades of continuous, astounding economic tour de force to the neglect 
of the modernization and democratization of its political structure and 
socio-political power conﬁguration.
In their cynical take on the teleological hopes invested in the presumed 
continuous transition of the PRC from authoritarianism to liberal de-
mocracy, similar to what China's East Asian neighbours went through, 
especially South Korea and Taiwan, Dirlik and Prazniak (2012: 287-288) 
posed three questions: 
First is the relationship to the legacies of the revolution of the Party and 
the people at large, including many dissidents, which is hardly the one-
dimensional relationship it is often assumed to be. Second is the relationship 
of questions of repression and dissent in the PRC to its structural context 
within global capitalism […] ﬁnally, is there a case to be made that the PRC 
is better off exploring socialist alternatives in economy, society and politics 
than emulating models whose future is very much in question, in which case 
critique should be directed at holding the Party to its promise of socialism 
rather than its failures to live up to the examples of those who themselves 
are in retreat from democracy?
Dirlik and Prazniak's ﬁrst two questions can be viewed in an inte-
grated context, for State governance and civil societal response in today's 
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China are intrinsically inseparable, while opponents of the Communist 
Party's continuing political monopoly have increasingly based their 
challenge upon the increasing socio-economic injustice under the Par-
ty's rule in the post-Mao era, and in facing the 'increasing legitimacy' 
of the Party's authoritarian grip following the last three decades of 
miraculous economic success of the 'China model'. This has resulted 
in a complex situation wherein, while the PRC 'presently suffers from 
severe economic and social inequality that may be sustained only by 
political repression',
It is frequently overlooked […] that economic and social inequality are 
products of the very development policies for which the PRC is widely 
admired. The ironic consequence is that criticism directed at the PRC for its 
democratic deﬁcit is more than compensated for by pressures to keep up a 
pattern and pace of development that gives priority to its functioning within 
the global system over the economic and political welfare of the population. 
Indeed, the 'China Model' has more than a few admirers who look to it with 
envy against the 'inefﬁciencies' thrown up by popular pursuit of justice in 
democratic societies. (Dirlik and Prazniak 2012: 287)
In his article, 'From 17th to 18th Party Congress: Implications for In-
tra-Party Democracy', Chen Gang examines how the new Xi Jinping (or 
Xi Jinping–Li Keqiang) administration strives to deal with the issue of 
regime legitimacy in an environment of a corrupted and inept ofﬁcial-
dom, together with the challenge posed by intensiﬁed factional rivalry 
at various levels of the Party by attempting to adjust the authoritarian 
ofﬁcial-selection system by resorting to various 'intra-party democracy' 
initiatives such as informal polls among inﬂuential party ofﬁcials and 
retirees.
On the economic front, even while the overall proportion of the Chi-
nese population in poverty dropped signiﬁcantly, from 30.7 per cent in 
1978 to 3.4 per cent in 2000, according to government statistics, income 
inequality has been increasing, with the Gini coefﬁcient reaching 0.415 in 
1995 and continuing to rise (Chai et al. 2004: 2). At his ﬁrst press confer-
ence in 2003 as China's premier, Wen Jiabao summarized the looming 
problems of his new post in a set of ﬁgures. These included China's 
labour force of 740 million vis-à-vis the Western advanced countries' 
total of just 430 million, and China's annual additional labour force of 
10 million, xiagang4 and unemployed of about 14 million, and the ru-
ral-to-urban migrant labour of about 120 million—all giving rise to the 
huge employment pressure the country was facing (Liu 2010). In terms 
of poverty and stratiﬁcation, Wen pointed out that there were 900 mil-
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lion peasants among the country's total population of 1.3 billion, with 
about 30 million still trapped in poverty. This latter ﬁgure was derived 
based on an annual income per capita of 625 yuan, which was in fact 
too low a poverty line. If the line were to be more accurately placed at 
825 yuan, the rural poverty population would be about 900 million. In 
terms of interregional disparity, Wen pointed out that the GDP of the 
ﬁve or six provinces in eastern coastal China had exceeded 50 per cent 
of the national total GDP (Chai et al. 2004: 2).
Hence, while China's reforms have been successful in giving many 
people higher incomes and producing more goods and services, they also 
have led to increasingly acute inequality in income and wealth among 
the populace. From one of the most egalitarian societies in the 1970s, 
China has turned into one of the most unequal countries in the region 
and even among developing countries in general. Bert Hoffman of the 
World Bank noted in 2006 that China's Gini coefﬁcient had risen from 
0.25 in 1980—equal to that of Germany—to about 0.45, as the country 
became less equal than Russia or the USA. Yan (2010), on the other 
hand, gave a 'conservative' Gini estimate of 0.475 for the year 2007. In 
the 1980s, the richest 10 per cent of the people of China earned seven 
times the income of the poorest 10 per cent; today they earn more than 
18 times as much.5 Or as another observer put it, 'Ever since the early 
years of reforms, the divide between the rich and the poor had been 
emerging, and it is now getting to the stage of ripping the entire society 
apart' (Zhou 2006: 286).
Similarly, Yan (2010) gave a high Gini coefﬁcient for all China as early 
as 1994 at above 0.43, which had risen to a 'conservative' estimate of 
0.475 in 2007; this is of course a far cry from the Gini coefﬁcient of below 
0.3 (averages of 0.16 and 0.22 for urban and rural areas respectively) 
before the economic reforms. This alarmingly high Gini of 0.475 in 2007 
represented a growth of 135 per cent from 1978, over a 29-year period 
in which GDP per capita (at constant prices) had grown by almost ten 
times over the pre-reform level with an average annual growth rate of 
8.6 per cent. Yan (2010: 176-177) divided this growth of inequality into 
four phases:
1. The 'relatively egalitarian' (by international standard) period of 
1978–1984 with Gini between 0.2 and 0.3 and little urban–rural 
disparity, while the rural economy developed immensely under 
the full force of reform;
2. The 'relatively justiﬁable' period of 1985–1992 with Gini hovering 
between 0.3 and 0.4 while the whole economy was expanding vi-
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brantly with the emphasis of reform shifting to the cities beginning 
in 1984. However, the accompanying inﬂation and expansion of the 
income gap had begun to overshoot people's psychological expecta-
tion threshold, resulting in rather serious social instability;
3. The worrying period of 1993–2000 of yearly increasing Gini index, 
with increasingly rapid reform and marketization pushing Gini over 
the internationally alarming line of 0.4 in 1993, and further over 0.43 
in 1994, before the coefﬁcient dropped back below 0.4 in 1995 and 
1996. But it rose again with increasing urban–rural, employment, 
intercommunal and interstratum differentiation amidst the inten-
sifying marketization and growth of the private-sector economy 
following the 15th National Congress of the Communist Party of 
China (CPC);
4. The high interest polarization period from 2001 to the present, 
wherein the globalization of China's growing economy and the 
wealth effect of the capital market have led to the continuous ex-
pansion of the income gap, with Gini reaching 0.475 in 2007, even 
by a 'conservative' estimate.
Yan (2010: 177-178) further pointed out that China's rural Gini has 
always been higher than the urban, implying that the intra-rural income 
disparity is fueling the expansion of the national income disparity, 
while the urban–rural income disparity is almost the main cause of the 
continuous expansion of the national income gap. In fact, the top 20 per 
cent urban income group's income is shown to be 5.5 times the income 
of the bottom 20 per cent urban income group whereas the top 20 per 
cent rural income group's income is 7.3 times the income of the bottom 
20 per cent rural income group.6 Besides the urban–rural gap, such 
widening of income and wealth disparity is also manifest in various 
other aspects. Yan's analysis shows further that changes in the national 
Gini are positively related to changes in the urban–rural income ratio. 
Yan concludes that China's present Gini coefﬁcient has reached a stage 
of too great a disparity and could be even higher if various informal 
incomes of the middle and upper strata are included in the calculation, 
even allowing for some scholars' view that China's Gini could be per-
mitted to be higher, e.g. at 0.45, a line that had almost been reached as 
early as 2001.
Loo-See Beh, in her article, 'China's Left-behind Children (Liu-shou-er-
tong): Development and Challenges for the Future', looks at an important 
social phenomenon that has resulted from the abovementioned widen-
ing socio-economic inequality and urban–rural disparity—the 'left-be-
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hind children' (liu-shou-er or liu-shou-er-tong). These are the children left 
behind in the villages or smaller townships when their parents move to 
larger urban areas as migrant workers. Beh highlights several challenges 
posed by this phenomenon to Chinese society and economy. It is endan-
gering the next generation's development due to the severe mental and 
physical problems faced by these children during their growing stage, 
including poor performance in school, which affects their character 
and values as they become adults.  It is endangering society's security 
as they have a higher risk of being involved as victims of accidents and 
crimes (e.g., sexual assaults on left-behind girls in rural areas account 
for the majority of reported assaults, according to the state news agency 
Xinhua) vis-à-vis children with both parents staying with them. They 
also tend to become criminals in later life because of the lack of super-
vision from parents to guide them on the proper way of life. This also 
endangers China's overall sustainable development and maintenance 
of the society's ethical and moral values. At 58 million, according to 
the All-China Women's Federation (ACWF) in 2008 based on the 2005 
by-census, this means that one third or 28.29 per cent of the total 
population of rural children are 'left-behind children', a number that 
will inevitably increase in the future. Beh points out the importance 
of dealing with this problem before it becomes bigger and thus hinders 
the social and economic growth and development of China. Hence it is 
vital to analyse and ﬁnd possible solutions relating to these problems, 
especially in terms of their education, health and social security. 
As highlighted by Beh's paper in the case of the 'left-behind' chil-
dren, Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh and Kah-Mun Chu, in their article, 'Literacy 
and Education in Contemporary China: Daunting Challenges amidst 
Rapid Economic Development', recognize the signiﬁcant relationship 
between education (and the eradication of illiteracy) and economic de-
velopment as well as the effect of structural changes on the education 
system, and that literacy is the key to move China forward. The gov-
ernment of China, the country with the largest population and human 
resources among the developing countries in the world, according to 
Yeoh and Chu, has always been aware of the importance of education 
in leading the nation to economic development, and over the years 
the government has been increasing the funding for public education. 
Yet, there are still poor families today who face problems in sending 
their children to school. While the cost of tuition and books has been 
increasing rapidly as richer families are sending their children for extra 
tuition, children in the rural areas are often more useful working in 
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the ﬁelds than going to school. They become the direct victims of the 
new elitism, resulting in an increase in the number of illiterate youths 
as the dropout rate mirrors the rate of overall social dissatisfaction. In 
terms of State policy on education, the Chinese government launched 
the 'Resolution on Educational System Reform' in May 1985, and with 
this local governments were assigned full responsibility for primary 
education. As a result, schools with insufﬁcient funds were unable 
to provide proper education to children, and consequently, the local 
governments shifted some of the burden of fees to the parents, which 
indirectly impeded poor families' sending their children to school. This 
was a problem especially where funding was unequal between rural 
and urban areas. Shortly thereafter, in 1986 the government doubled its 
investment in the education sector by introducing the 'Law of Nine-Year 
Compulsory Education' throughout China, level by level, according to 
the different areas' degree of socio-economic development. However, 
rural and urban areas are still being divided in terms of literacy rates, 
and gaps between these areas could widen even further.
The articles collected in this special issue thus show that despite the 
remarkable economic achievement in recent decades, the contemporary 
rise of China has brought various critical issues to the fore, which the 
country's government and the ruling Communist Party must urgently 
address. These are issues spanning the domains of political structure, 
foreign reach of the country's inﬂuence, socio-economic malaise and 
public policy in education to bridge the rural–urban gap, reduce in-
equality and maintain long-term social stability.
Earlier versions of the papers in this special issue were presented at the 
international conference 'From Hu-Wen to Xi-Li Administration: China's 
Leadership Transition and Its Domestic and International Implications', 
jointly organized by the Institute of China Studies, University of Malaya, 
and the East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore, on 12-13 
September 2013, in Kuala Lumpur.
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NOTES
1  Dongfang Ribao (Oriental Daily News, Malaysian daily), 16 January 2009. 'Yuan' is 
the largest denomination of China's currency 'renminbi' (RMB), equivalent to about 
US$0.146 at the time referred to or today to about US$0.161.
2  Dongfang Ribao (Oriental Daily News, Malaysian daily), 9 August 2010.
3  'Mo zhe shitou guo he.'
4  The term 'xiagang' refers to redundant workers mainly at state enterprises, without 
directly describing them as 'unemployed'. Still ofﬁcially attached to their work units 
or enterprises, the xiagang workers continue to receive basic minimum subsidies 
for their living and medical expenses, and are encouraged to change jobs, probably 
through state-run job and re-employment centres, or go into small businesses.
5  Bert Hoffman, 'Access to Opportunity Eases Income Inequality', The Star (Malaysian 
daily), 21 January 2006.
6  Yan (2010: 179), based on data from China Statistical Yearbook 2008.
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